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Abstract
The widely denounced replicability crisis in science hints at revised standards of
significance. The customary frequentist confidence intervals, calibrated through hy-
pothetical repetitions of the experiment that is supposed to have produced the data
at hand, have a feeble concept of replicability. In particular, contrasting conclusions
may be reached when a substantial enlargement of the study is undertaken. To rede-
fine statistical confidence in such a way that inferential conclusions are compatible,
with large enough probability, under enlargements of the sample, we give a new read-
ing of a proposal dating back to the 60’s, Robbins’ confidence sequences. Directly
bounding the probability of reaching, in the future, conclusions incompatible with
the current ones, Robbins’ confidence sequences ensure a clear-cut form of replica-
bility when inference is performed on accumulating data. Moreover, we show that
they can be justified under various views of inference. They are likelihood based, can
incorporate prior information, obey the strong likelihood principle. They are easily
computable, even when inference is on a parameter of interest. Finally, their main
frequentist property is easy both to understand and to prove.
Keywords: Bayes factor; Confidence region; Laplace expansion; Profile likelihood; Revision
of standards; Statistical evidence.
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1 Introduction
Announcing a result is a hazard when the supporting evidence is statistical in nature. In
the long run, scientific credibility is jeopardized if discoveries are claimed or implied (or un-
derstood) to be more firmly established than they will eventually prove to be. The issue has
become pressing, especially after the denounce of a replicability crisis in science by Ioanni-
dis (2005) and many others on its wake, triggering the recent ASA statement, Wasserstein
and Lazar (2016). To reduce failure to replicate, more strict evidential thresholds are pro-
pounded in the literature, see Johnson (2013), possibly variable by discipline (Goodman,
2016). Benjamin et al. (2017) advocate changing the standard threshold for significance
from 0.05 to 0.005, while Lakens et al. (2017) recommend a case by case transparently
justified choice, better if pre-registered. A general warning against the dichotomization of
evidence is given in McShane and Gal (2017).
When interest lies in reporting e↵ect sizes and related confidence intervals (see e.g.
Nakagawa and Cuthill, 2007), a revision of standards for statistical significance would
entail a parallel revision of standards for confidence levels, say from 0.95 to 0.995. These
higher levels are not, however, linked to some formal replicability requirement. In this
note we bring to the fore a simple but apparently new concept of replicability for inference
based on confidence regions and explore its relations with a proposal dating back to the
60s, Robbins’ confidence sequences (Robbins, 1970; see also Darling and Robbins, 1967a,b).
We interpret here replicability as assurance that compatible conclusions are reached
when information increases, i.e. the sample is enlarged. To be specific, inferential con-
clusions from confidence regions for the same parameter are compatible if these regions
overlap, incompatible if their intersection is empty. Compatible confidence regions are also
said to be non-contradictory.
As a form of replicability, non-contradiction is especially compelling in experimental
sciences when inference is performed on accumulating data. Early conclusions are suscepti-
ble to be falsified within the matter of years or months, and sometimes even earlier. When
the true state of nature, or a much more reliable representation of it, becomes eventually
available, reputational penalty ensuing from hasty wrong conclusions could be large. This
denouement does not happen in hard sciences alone. Think for instance of estimating the
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result of an election from early reporting counting areas, where the estimate is made only
hours before a winner is declared. Other contexts where coherence under sample enlarge-
ment seems to be cogent are long-term epidemiological studies and drugs surveillance.
We show that the use of confidence sets ensuing from Robbins’ approach produces com-
patible confidence regions with large enough probability, at least in the idealized situation
of i.i.d. sampling from a correctly specified parametric model. Robbins’ papers are highly
technical and reasearch on confidence sequences seems to have been neglected after the
equally technical contributions Lai (1976) and Csenki (1979). We try here to give an acces-
sible account and to highlight the bearing of Robbins’ confidence sequences on principles
of statistical inference.
Fixed level confidence regions, even with a higher revised level, fail to fulfill the compat-
ibility requirement. Hence, they correspond to a feeble sense of replicability. As a simple
example, consider i.i.d. sampling from a normal distribution with known variance  20. Let
Ȳn =
Pn
i=1 Yi/n be the sample mean. Then









and the probability that (1   ↵)-level confidence intervals for the mean at sample sizes n
























Therefore the probability is 1 of finding a couple of disjoint intervals, i.e. of observing
a sequence of samples that gives rise to incompatible (1   ↵)-level confidence intervals.
When the realistically attainable sample size is very large but finite, though the usual
confidence intervals shrink towards the true value of the parameter as the sample size
increases, conflicting conclusions may be reported at various stages of the data acquisition
process, with a probability that may be close to 1.
A side advantage of Robbins’ confidence sequences is their justification under various
views of inference. They are likelihood based, can incorporate prior information, have
frequentist properties, have Bayesian properties under a proper prior, obey the strong like-
lihood principle. On top of that, Robbins’ confidence sequences have great pedagogical
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benefits. They need virtually no sample space calculations (Fisherian distribution prob-
lems disappear) and require a fairly limited amount of parameter space calculations, the
expectation of a scalar function, easily performed by simulation.
The outline of the paper is as follows. A new reading of Robbins’ confidence sequences is
given in Section 2. Their inferential properties are summarized in Section 3, with technical
details provided in the Appendix. Section 4 presents two examples and illustrates the
replicability properties of Robbins’ confidence sequences through simulation results dealing
with normal mean and binomial probability. Section 5 concludes.
2 Non-contradiction and Robbins’ confidence sequences
Let us consider the highly idealized and simplified situation of a statistician who is poten-
tially able to obtain any number n of i.i.d. observations y(n) = (y1, . . . , yn), realization of
the random vector Y (n) = (Y1, . . . , Yn). Let P✓ denote the joint probability distribution of
the sequence Y (1) = (Y1, Y2, . . .). We suppose that P✓ belongs to a statistical model with
parameter space ⇥ ✓ IRp. Let pn(y(n); ✓) denote the density of Y (n) under P✓. Assume
that, for every given n, all these densities are strictly positive on the same support, i.e.,
the support does not depend on ✓.
A confidence region, based on y(n) and constructed according to a certain rule, is a
subset of ⇥ denoted by ⇥̂n = ⇥̂(y(n)). A confidence sequence is a sequence of confidence
regions. To avoid triviality, we consider only confidence sequences that are consistent, i.e.
such that limn!1 P✓(✓0 2 ⇥̂n) = 0 for every ✓0 6= ✓, where ✓, ✓0 2 ⇥. Consistency implies









0 2 ⇥̂n) = 0 .
We will say that a confidence sequence is non-contradictory if no ⇥̂n is contradicted by
a ⇥̂n+m, for some m > 0. Contradiction happens when, for an m > 0, ⇥̂n \ ⇥̂n+m = ;.
When a confidence sequence is non-contradictory, there are conclusions that are common
to all confidence statements, i.e., \n 1⇥̂n 6= ;. Consistency ensures that non-contradictory
sequences shrink towards the true parameter value. Indeed, for consistent confidence se-
quences, only the true ✓ may belong to \n 1⇥̂n, even though with probability strictly less
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than 1.











✓ 2 ⇥̂n for every n   1
⌘
.
It follows that, if, for 0 < " < 1,
P✓
⇣
✓ 2 ⇥̂n for every n   1
⌘







so that the probability of contradiction as evidence accumulates is held in check.
Confidence sequences satisfying (1) are obtained in Robbins (1970, see formula (3)).
A heuristic argument for their consistency is outlined in the Appendix. Robbins’ regions,




✓ 2 ⇥ : pn(y(n); ✓) > "qn(y(n))
 
, (2)






(n); ✓)⇡(✓) d✓ .
Above, the weight function ⇡(✓) is a preset probability density over ⇥ with ⇡(✓) > 0 for
every ✓ 2 ⇥. The value 1   " will be called here the assured persistence level, or simply
the persistence level, of the confidence sequence.
To illustrate the pedagogical virtues of the approach, the proof in Robbins (1970) that
the sequence of regions ⇥̂1 "(Y (n)) satisfies (1) is sketched in the Appendix. The key
argument is an inequality giving a bound on the probability of reaching strongly misleading
evidence from the likelihood ratio statistic (Royall, 1997, page 7).
Robbins’ confidence sequences are likelihood-based. Specifically, ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) is the re-
gion of ✓ values whose likelihood L(✓; y(n)) = pn(y(n); ✓) is large, in particular larger than a
preset fraction of the integrated likelihood qn(y(n)). Therefore, regions (2) are invariant un-
der one-to-one transformations of y and one-to-one transformations of ✓. The computation
of qn(y(n)) incorporates prior information, notional or real. In either way, the importance
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of the choice of the prior is downplayed because property (1) holds for every preset spec-
ification of ⇡(✓), provided ⇡(✓) does not place probability 0 on a plausible region of ⇥.
Examples of the e↵ects of di↵erent choices of the prior are given in Section 4. Confidence
regions (2) are nested, i.e., ⇥̂1 "0(y(n)) ✓ ⇥̂1 "(y(n)), when 1   "0 < 1   ". The maximum
likelihood estimate ✓̂n is always in ⇥̂1 "(y(n)), being pn(y(n); ✓̂n)   qn(y(n)).
When the parameter is partitioned as ✓ = ( , ), where  2  is a p0-dimensional
component of interest and   is nuisance, in some cases inference on  can be based on a
statistic t(n) = t(yn) producing a marginal or conditional model free of  . In these cases,
pn(t(n); ) or pn(y(n)|t(n); ) may replace pn(y(n); ✓) in (2) and q(y(n)) is redefined accord-
ingly. However, the implementation of Robbins’ confidence sequences for a parameter of
interest is also feasible when a reduction by marginalization or conditioning is not avail-
able, and does not require sample space calculations. The confidence sequence for  is the




 2  : ( , ) 2 ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) for some  
o
. (3)




 2  : pn(y(n); ,  ̂ ) > "qn(y(n))
o
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(n); ✓)⇡(✓) d✓ ,
as above, independently of  =  (✓).
3 Frequentist, pure likelihood and Bayesian proper-
ties









entails that the marginal asymptotic coverage of ⇥̂1 "(Y (n)) is one,
lim
n!1
P✓(✓ 2 ⇥̂1 "(Y (n))) = 1 . (4)
Details are in the Appendix. This behaviour contrasts greatly with what is usually sought
for in conventional frequentist inference, i.e., asymptotic coverage equal to the nominal
level 1   ↵. Under this respect, a frequentist statistician willing to ensure her confidence
regions to be non-contradictory with positive probability seems to have to pay a price in
terms of overcoverage for fixed n.
A revival of Robbins’ confidence sequences entails a novel concept of confidence, in-
volving the current size n experiment and its future, hypothetical or not, enlargements. A
persistence level 1  " has the frequentist assurance that
P✓
⇣
✓ 2 ⇥̂1 "(Y (m)) for every m   n
⌘




\m n⇥̂1 "(Y (m)) 6= ;
⌘
  1  " .
In practice, we have high confidence that no contradiction with ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) would occur with
larger sample sizes, even in settings where the sample enlargement is only hypothetical.
It is important to stress that what happened for sample sizes from 1 to n   1 does
not matter. Moreover, although the sequence \jn⇥̂1 "(Y (j)) satisfies (1) as well, it is
not eligible as a sensible confidence sequence because \jn⇥̂1 "(y(j)) could be empty, and
therefore not consistent.
There is another way to express the frequentist assurance coming with ⇥̂1 "(Y (n)). From
P✓
⇣






















✓ 2 ⇥̂1 "(Y (n))
⌘   1  " .
Therefore, if ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) covers the truth (an easily conceded premise if n is large enough,
in view of (4)), then, with probability at least 1  ", no contradiction with ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) will
be seen in future enlargements of the study.
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Moreover, the reward for overcoverage in a fixed n perspective is that Robbins’ con-
fidence sequence (2) o↵ers inference that rarely fails to reproduce even in a multiple in-
vestigation perspective. Let the sequences Y (n) and Y ⇤(n
0) be independent with the same
statistical model {P✓, ✓ 2 ⇥ ✓ IRp} and the same true parameter value. Statistician A will
observe the initial part of the sequence Y (n), statistician B will observe the initial part of
the sequence Y ⇤(n
0). If both adopt and communicate publicly Robbins’ confidence regions
with the same ", though with possibly di↵erent preset weight functions, they will be usually









✓ 2 ⇥̂1 "(Y (n)) \ ⇥̂1 "(Y ⇤(n
0)) for every n, n0   1
⌘
  (1  ")2 .
In fact, conventional inference, both Bayesian and frequentist, is contingent on the
current sample or the generating mechanism of the current sample. Inference from Robbins’
confidence sequences is in a sense absolute, it leads to conclusions that with reasonably high
probability can withstand any further scrutiny under the same data generating model. From
a practical stance, as traditional confidence regions give at best what they promise, the same
is true of Robbins’ confidence sequences. Both are vulnerable to model misspecification.
Regions ⇥̂1 "(y(n)), depending on the data only through the likelihood function, agree
with the strong likelihood principle. In particular, they obey both the su ciency and
the conditionality principles. For su ciency, let s(n) = s(y(n)) be a su cient statistic for
pn(y(n); ✓), ✓ 2 ⇥ ✓ IRp, so that
pn(y




(n); ✓) the marginal density of S(n) = s(Y (n)) and pn(y(n)|s(n)) the conditional
density of Y (n) given S(n) = s(n). Then, ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) = ⇥̂1 "(s(n)), as is easy to see. As to
the conditionality, let a(n) = a(y(n)) be a distribution constant statistic, so that
pn(y
















so that regions ⇥̂1 "(Y (n)) have probability of contradiction bounded by " also conditionally
on a(n).









is a Bayes factor, Kass and Raftery (1995). In fact, Kass and Raftery (1995, Section 3.2)
suggest quantitative standards for interpretation of (5) as evidence against the hypothesis
✓. For instance, decisive evidence requires (5) greater than 100. This corresponds " = 0.01
in (2) and hence a persistence level equal to 0.99.










✓ 2 ⇥ : ⇡(✓|y(n)) > "⇡(✓)
 
. (6)
The complementary set ⇥̄1 "(y(n)) = ⇥ \ ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) has posterior probability
Z
⇥̄1 "(y(n))
⇡(✓|y(n)) d✓  "
Z
⇥̄1 "(y(n))
⇡(✓) d✓  " .
Therefore, ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) has posterior probability at least 1  ".
Credible regions ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) have bounded probability of being contradictory even in a
Bayesian sense. Indeed, let P be the joint probability model of ✓ and Y (1), where ✓ has
marginal density ⇡(✓) and, given ✓, Y (1) has conditional distribution P✓. In this setting, (1)









  1  " .
Representation (6) shows that inference from Robbins’ confidence sequences proceeds by
subtraction, eliminating the most implausible values of ✓. Viewing the prior as a posterior




The implementation of Robbins’ confidence sequences requires the specification of ⇡(✓)
and the choice of " or a range of " values. These issues are sketched through two simple
examples.
Example 1. Normal population with known variance.
Suppose that Yi, i = 1, 2, . . ., are i.i.d. N(✓,  20), with unknown mean ✓ and known variance
 
2. Reduction by su ciency produces the sequence of sample means Ȳn =
Pn
i=1 Yi/n with




















































After some algebra, Robbins’ confidence sequence ⇥̂1 "(ȳn) = {✓ 2 IR : pn(ȳn; ✓)   "qn(ȳn)}














⌧ 20 +  
2
0/n
  2 log " .
A simulation study has been performed in order to shed some light on the practical
bearing of using Robbins’ confidence sequences vis-à-vis the customary confidence intervals.
A sequence of confidence intervals (✓n, ✓̄n) shows a contradiction in the range nmin  n 
nmax whenever max(✓n) > min(✓̄n), where min and max are over the n values of interest.
Analogously, the sequence shows non-coverage of ✓ at some n in the range nmin  n  nmax
whenever, over the n values considered, max(✓n) > ✓ or min(✓̄n) < ✓. Contradictions and
non-coverages have been monitored for 1,000 replications of enlarging samples of size n
with nmin = 1 and nmax = 40, 000.
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Table 1: Normal population with known variance: empirical percentages of contradictions
and non-coverages at some n for intervals for the mean with confidence level 1 ↵ in 1,000
sequences of samples with size from 1 to 40,000.
100(1  ↵) 90 95 99 99.5
contradictions 76.9 51.1 12.8 7.4
non-coverages 90.3 68.9 26.0 15.7
In Table 1 the results for confidence intervals ȳn ±  0z1 ↵/2/
p
n, with confidence level
1  ↵ = 0.90, 0.95, 0.99, 0.995, are shown. Contradictions and non-coverages are dominant
for the levels 90% and 95%. They are both comparatively uncommon for the level 99.5%,
but their relative frequency could be made as close to 1 as desired by letting nmax large
enough. In the same scenario, all non-coverages become contradictions. The simulation
has been performed by sampling standard normal deviates, the results, however, do not
depend on the true value of the parameters of the normal population.
Table 2 displays the results for Robbins’ confidence sequences with persistence levels
1 " = 0.50, 0.80, 0.90, 0.95 and various prior distributions on ✓. When the prior is concen-
trated around the true ✓, contradictions and non-coverages are comparatively abundant,
but their relative frequency remains under the upper bound probability ". When the prior
is discrepant from the likelihood, that is µ0 is far from ✓, the conflict between the two is
resolved in favour of the likelihood, through wider confidence regions. As is seen, this coun-
terbalance increases conservativeness of the " bound. Apart from these cases, the results
in terms of observed contradictions and non-coverages for some n in the range 1–40,000
when 1 " = 0.80 are qualitatively comparable with those for the customary intervals with
confidence level 0.995.
Example 2: Bernoulli population.
Suppose that Yi, i = 1, 2, . . . are i.i.d. Bernoulli Bi(1, ✓), with unknown mean ✓ 2 (0, 1).
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Table 2: Normal population with known variance 1: empirical percentages of contradic-
tions and non-coverages at some n for Robbins’ confidence sequences for the mean with
persistence level 1  " in 1,000 sequences of samples with size from 1 to 40,000 and various
normal priors on the mean. The true value of the mean is 0.
prior 100(1  ") 50 80 90 95
µ0 = 0, ⌧ 20 = 0.1 contradictions 29.9 8.3 4.0 1.2
non-coverages 42.7 15.4 7.6 4.2
µ0 = 0, ⌧ 20 = 1.0 contradictions 26.0 9.4 4.5 1.8
non-coverages 32.7 13.1 7.2 3.1
µ0 = 0, ⌧ 20 = 10 contradictions 13.0 5.0 2.4 1.3
non-coverages 15.8 6.9 3.3 1.6
µ0 = 1, ⌧ 20 = 1.0 contradictions 21.5 7.0 3.2 1.6
non-coverages 25.9 9.9 5.1 2.4
µ0 = 2, ⌧ 20 = 1.0 contradictions 12.6 4.3 2.2 1.2
non-coverages 14.3 5.0 2.7 1.6
µ0 = 5, ⌧ 20 = 1.0 contradictions 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.0
non-coverages 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0
Reduction by su ciency produces the sequence of sample sums Sn =
Pn
i=1 Yi, whose model















where ↵,   > 0 and B(↵,  ) =  (↵) ( )/ (↵+  ). With this prior, the marginal distribu-






B(sn + ↵, n  sn +  )
B(↵,  )
.
The choice ↵ =   = 0.5 is Je↵reys’ prior. When ↵ =   = 1 the prior is a continuous
uniform distribution on [0, 1] and the marginal distribution of Sn is discrete uniform on
{0, 1, . . . , n}. Intervals that form the Robbins’ confidence sequence
⇥̂1 "(ȳn) = {✓ 2 IR : pn(ȳn; ✓)   "qn(ȳn)}
have not a closed-form expression but are easily computed numerically.
Intervals with asymptotic confidence level 1  ↵ are obtained from the likelihood ratio




✓ 2 (0, 1) : pn(sn; ✓)   pn(sn; ✓̂n) exp{ 0.5 21,1 ↵}
o
,
where ✓̂n = sn/n is the maximum likelihood estimate and  21,1 ↵ is the (1 ↵)-quantile of a
chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom. Even these intervals are easily computed
numerically.
A small simulation study with various true ✓ values and various weight functions has
been performed. In particular, contradictions and non-coverages for n in the range nmin =
100 and nmax = 4, 000 have been enquired. The number of replications remains 1, 000.
Table 3 displays the results for the confidence intervals with confidence level 1   ↵ =
0.90, 0.95, 0.99, 0.995 obtained from the likelihood ratio statistic. Contradictions and non-
coverages are important when 1   ↵ = 0.90, 0.95, even over such a restricted range of n
values. The case 1  ↵ = 0.995 shows a marked improvement.
In table 4 results for Robbins’ confidence sequences with persistence levels 1   " =
0.50, 0.80, 0.90, 0.95 and various beta prior distributions on ✓ are shown. When the prior
is centered at the true ✓, non-coverages are comparatively abundant. Contradictions are
rarely observed due to the limited range of n considered. As expected, conservativeness
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Table 3: Bernoulli population: empirical percentages of contradictions and non-coverages
at some n for likelihood ratio intervals for the mean with confidence level 1   ↵ in 1,000
sequences of samples with size from 100 to 4,000.
100(1  ↵) 90 95 99 99.5
✓ = 0.5 contradictions 28.5 11.6 1.5 0.5
non-coverages 65.7 41.0 13.5 8.6
✓ = 0.7 contradictions 30.4 14.2 1.2 0.2
non-coverages 64.2 43.3 12.5 7.1
✓ = 0.9 contradictions 29.5 11.8 0.9 0.2
non-coverages 65.0 42.6 12.1 7.1
increases as the prior moves away from the true parameter value. Again, the results when
1  " = 0.80 are qualitatively comparable with those for the customary intervals with con-
fidence level 0.995.
5 Conclusions
Herbert E. Robbins is mostly acknowledged in Statistics for his path-breaking introduction
of empirical Bayes methods, stochastic approximation methods, and his contributions to
sequential analysis (Lai and Siegmund, 1986). On the other hand, his proposal of con-
fidence sequences has been largely neglected. One exception, at least in the statistical
literature, is Gandy and Hahn (2016), where Robbins’ confidence sequences provide a tool
to keep in check stochastic simulations. Robbins’ confidence sequences also inspired re-
peated confidence intervals (Jennison and Turnbull, 1989), where coverage of the true ✓ is
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required at a finite (typically small) number of interim analyses of a study. Notably, in the
discussion of Jennison and Turnbull (1989), Whitehead (1989) points to situations, such
as long-term epidemiological studies, where a fixed number of analyses “might become a
barrier”. Here, we have stressed the link between non-contradiction and coverage along
the whole sequence as the basis for a novel interest in Robbins’ confidence sequences. The
price to pay for controlling for the probability of non-contradiction is that wider regions
are needed. When data are scarce and di cult to obtain, this could appear as a serious
drawback of Robbins’ confidence sequences.
Robbins’ confidence sequences o↵er durable inferences, satisfying coverage requirements
along the whole sequence of samples. By contrast, inferences as those stemming from the
usual statistical procedures satisfy coverage requirements separately for any given sample
size. They may be called episodic inferences. The distinction between episodic and sequen-
tial environments appears in artificial intelligence, see Russel and Norvig (2010, Section
2.3.2). All in all, Robbins’ confidence sequences strengthen the standards of confidence,
and, thanks to their frequentist assurance, o↵er more compelling summarizations of evi-
dence.
Appendix
Robbins’ confidence sequences have the required persistent coverage (Robbins, 1970)
To see that, for regions of the form (2), inequality (1) holds for every ✓ 2 ⇥, consider that
P✓
⇣

















for some n   1
◆
.
The last probability does not exceed " in force of a fundamental inequality for the likelihood
ratio statistic.
Let P and Q denote the joint probability distribution of the sequence Y (1) when Y (n),











for any k > 0. Robbins’ proof of (7) is as follows. Define the stopping time
N = min
⇢











  k for some n
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Inequality (7) also follows from a well-known martingale inequality, see e.g. Jacod and
Protter (2000, Theorem 26.1).
A heuristic argument for the consistency of confidence sequences
Rigorous proofs of consistency of ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) when the density of Y (n) belongs to an expo-
nential family are given by Lai (1976) and Csenki (1979) for the one-parameter and the
multiparameter case, respectively. For models whose likelihood function obeys the usual
regularity conditions (see e.g. Severini, 2000, Section 3.4), consistency of ⇥̂1 "(y(n)) may
be seen by the following heuristic argument.
Assume that ✓̂n is the unique maximum of L(✓; y(n)) in an open neighborhood of the true
✓. Let `(✓; y(n)) = logL(✓; y(n)) be the log likelihood function and let jn(✓) = j(✓; y(n)) =
 @2`(✓; y(n))/@✓@✓> be the observed information. Assume moreover that, as under repeated
sampling of size n, `(✓;Y (n)) = Op(n) and j(✓̂n;Y (n)) is positive definite and of order Op(n).




























. Then, for ✓0 6= ✓,
P✓(✓
0 2 ⇥̂n) = P✓
⇣
`(✓̂n;Y
(n))  `(✓0;Y (n)) < kn +Op(1)
⌘
,









0 2 ⇥̂n) = 0 .
Proof of (4).




















then (4) follows from (9).
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Table 4: Bernoulli population: empirical percentages of contradictions and non-coverages
at some n for Robbins’ confidence sequences for the mean with persistence level 1   " in
1,000 sequences of samples with size from 100 to 4,000 and various priors on the mean.
true ✓ prior on ✓ 100(1  ") 50 80 90 95
0.5 Beta(.5, .5) contradictions 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0
non-coverages 8.5 4.1 2.3 1.0
0.5 Beta(1, 1) contradictions 1.8 0.4 0.2 0.0
non-coverages 10.5 5.9 3.3 1.7
0.5 Beta(5, 5) contradictions 6.3 1.1 0.4 0.2
non-coverages 20.5 10.0 6.0 3.4
0.7 Beta(.5, .5) contradictions 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0
non-coverages 7.2 3.0 1.7 0.5
0.7 Beta(1, 1) contradictions 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
non-coverages 10.3 3.7 2.3 0.8
0.7 Beta(5, 5) contradictions 2.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
non-coverages 12.0 5.6 2.1 1.3
0.9 Beta(.5, .5) contradictions 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
non-coverages 6.9 2.4 1.3 0.7
0.9 Beta(1, 1) contradictions 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
non-coverages 6.1 2.3 1.2 0.7
0.9 Beta(5, 5) contradictions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
non-coverages 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.1
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